We describe a modular programming style that harnesses modern type systems to verify safety conditions in practical systems. This style has three ingredients:
Introduction
This paper demonstrates a lightweight notion of static capabilities (Walker et al. 2000 ) that brings together increasingly expressive type systems and increasingly accessible program verication. Like many programmers, before verifying that our code is correct, we want to assure safety conditions: array indices remain within bounds; modular arithmetic operates on numbers with the same modulus; a le or database handle is used only while open; and so on. The safety conditions protect objects such as arrays, modular numbers, and les. Our overarching view is that a capability authorizes access to a protected object and simultaneously certies that a safety condition holds. Rather than proposing a new language or system, our contribution is to substantiate the slogan that types are capabilities, today:
we use concrete and straightforward code in Haskell and OCaml to illustrate that a programming language with an appropriately expressive type system is a static capability language. Because the capabilities are checked at compile time, we achieve the safety assurances with minimal impact to run-time performance.
This paper is electronically published in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs Section 2 presents a simplied introductory example: empty-list checking. Section 3 turns to a full-featured example: array-bound checking. In each case, we formalize our technique as a syntactic translation between two languages. Section 4 distills the three ingredients of our programming style and describes how expressive it needs the type system to be. Section 5 discusses related and future work.
Our technique scales up: First, shown in the Appendix is a more substantial example, Knuth-Morris-Pratt string search. Second, the Takusen database-access project uses our technique to verify the safety of session handles, cursors, preparedstatement handles, and result sets. For instance, any operation on a session is guaranteed to receive a valid session handle. We take our examples from Xi's pioneering work on practical dependent-type systems and Dependent ML, as well as from user suggestions.
Empty-list checking
We start with a simplied introductory example. Although it does not show all features of our approach, it sets the pattern we follow throughout the paper. The example is list reversal with an accumulator, which can be written in OCaml as let rec rev l acc = if null l then acc else rev (tail l) (cons (head l) acc)
The code is written for an arbitrary data structure satisfying the list API (null, cons, head and tail), so it does not use pattern matching.
The functions head and tail are partial because they do not make sense for the empty list. Therefore, these functions, to be safe, must check their argument for null before deconstructing it. This code for rev checks the same list l for null three times: once directly by calling null, and twice indirectly in head and tail.
We can remove excessive checks and gain condence in the code by prohibiting attempts to deconstruct the empty list. We rst dene an abstract data type 'a fullList with the interface and implementation below.
module FL : sig type 'a fullList val unfl : 'a fullList -> 'a list val indeed : 'a list -> 'a fullList option val head : 'a fullList -> 'a val tail : 'a fullList -> 'a list end = struct type 'a fullList = 'a list let unfl l = l let indeed l = if null l then None else Some l let head l = Unsafe.head l let tail l = Unsafe.tail l end Here Unsafe.head blindly gives the head of its list argument, without checking if the argument is null. We claim that in well-typed programs the functions FL.head and FL.tail are total.
Our list reversal with accumulator is now safer and more ecient: 2 let rec rev' l acc = match FL.indeed l with | None -> acc | Some l -> rev' (FL.tail l) (cons (FL.head l) acc)
The code is basically the same as before, but it checks for null only once. (Appel and Leroy 2006) . However, to avoid extending the underlying type system with this subtyping, we make projection explicit as indeed, and injection explicit as unfl. Experience with toEnum, fromEnum, fromIntegral, etc. in Haskell suggests that the resulting notational overhead is bearable, even familiar.
Another way to view the fullList certicate is as a capability (Miller et al. 2000) that authorizes access to the list components. This capability is static because it is expressed in a type rather than a value (Walker et al. 2000) . This idea, to express the result of a dynamic value test as a static type certicate, is important in dependent-type programming (Altenkirch et al. 2005; Section 5) . It is reminiscent of safe type-casting in type dynamic and of the type-equality assertions of Pa²ali¢ et al. (2002) .
As above, the functions in the security kernel are generally simple and not recursive. In contrast, the client code whose safety we eventually wish to assure (rev in our example) is recursive. This pattern recurs throughout this paper: in the most complex example, Knuth-Morris-Pratt string search, the client code is imperative and nonprimitively recursive, yet the security kernel relies merely on addition, subtraction, and comparison.
Of course, safety depends on the fact that the capability is only issued for a nonempty list. Thus the security kernel has to be veried, perhaps formally. Because FL.fullList is opaque, we need only check that indeed issues the capability only when the list is nonempty. This claim is straightforward to prove formally: T :
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T :
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Fig. 1. Formalizing empty-list checking
• On one hand, we could prove along the operational lines of Moggi and Sabry (2001) and Walker et al. (2000) that no expression evaluates to an empty fullList.
• Or, we could show along the denotational lines of Launchbury and Jones (1995) that the functions in FL are parametric even when the logical relation for fullList excludes the empty fullList (Mitchell and Meyer 1985) .
Either way, our proof is simpler than these authors' (for example, the logical relation may be unary rather than binary) because our safety condition is simpler (for example, we do not prove that the fullList does not escape some dynamic extent of execution).
2.2 Formalization
We now formally verify safety, by translating from a language called Strict to a language called Lax. We specify the security kernel by Strict and implement it in Lax. Figure 1 shows the type systems of both Strict and Lax, which extend System F and dier in only one rule. Strict's distinguished typing rule looks`fancy' and has the avor of dependent types. However, it simply ascribes a type to an expression of a particular syntactic structure, just like the other, more familiar rules.
The dynamic small-step semantics of these languages are the same and standard.
The only interesting reduction rules are the following (where E 1 , etc. are all values):
head (nonempty E 1 ::
For example, both Strict and Lax admit the following transition, which starts to compute the head of the list 5 :: 7 :: nil.
indeed (5 :: 7 :: nil) 0 (λx. head x) (λx. head x) nonempty (5 :: 7 :: nil)
We have formally proved, in Twelf, 1 that the type system of Strict is sound:
it essentially performs abstract interpretation conservatively to ensure that a well- When we embed Lax into Haskell or OCaml, the implementation of the rules (1) becomes the security kernel. Sandboxing stipulates that the data constructor nonempty may appear in the kernel only, not in the embedding of a sandboxed Lax program. We enforce this stipulation using Haskell or OCaml's module system. The security kernel is correct if it implements the reduction rules of (1). We can check that the kernel is correct by inspecting it informally or verifying it formally.
3 Array-bound checking
We next illustrate our approach on the problem of array-bound checking in binary search (Xi and Pfenning 1998) . This example involves array-index arithmetic and The text after <| are dependent-type annotations that the programmer must specify.
An attempt: parameterized modules
This example diers from the one in Section 2 in an important way. There, we merely need to distinguish a nonempty list from a general list, so one abstract type 'a fullList is enough. Here, to ensure that an array of size n is only accessed with non-negative indices less than n, we need two abstract types for each n: one for arrays of size n and one for non-negative indices less than n. That is, we need two innite type families, parameterized by the array size n. Because the value n is only known at run-time, dependent types seem called for.
Even though OCaml is usually not considered dependently typed, we can build such type families in OCaml, by encapsulating type declarations into a module parameterized over a value signature, and instantiating such a module inside a let expression (Frisch 2006) . The interface and implementation of our trusted kernel would then look like the following. A (non-bottom) value of type 'a BA.barray is an array of size n, and a (non-bottom) value of type BA.bindex is a non-negative index less than n, where n is the size of the array arr in scope for constructing the instance of module BA. Consequently, if the expression BA.get a i is well typed and a and i are non-bottom values, then the index i is within the bounds of the array a. 3
Because TrustedKernel is stateless, it can assure array-bound safety by relying merely on the fact that instances of module BA for dierent values of length are type-incompatible in OCaml. However, in the general case where the kernel has eects such as state, we need generative type abstraction: any two instantiations of module BA should be type-incompatible, even with the same length (Dreyer et al. 2003 ). This generativity also corresponds to the fresh region index of Moggi and Sabry (2001;  Figure 4 ). Alas, functors are not generative in OCaml. They are in SML, but most implementations (including SML/NJ) do not allow constructing a module inside let.
The solution: higher-rank types
Our solution is to emulate the generative module BA above using higher-rank types (Mitchell and Plotkin 1988; Russo 1998; Shao 1999a,b; Shields and Peyton Jones 2001, 2002) . The OCaml code below corresponds as closely to the Dependent ML code above as possible, yet is more amenable to formalization. The emulation also works in Haskell, which does not have local module expressions.
4
Our solution uses not only higher-rank but also higher-kind types. Rather than using types like 'a barray and bindex, we parameterize them to form types like ('s,'a) barray and 's bindex. We call the extra type parameter 's a brand. 5
Each possible size is represented by a type: perhaps unit represents 0, unit list represents 1, unit list list represents 2, and so on. Our kernel use these typelevel proxies to brand arrays of that size and indices within that range (Pa²ali¢ et al. 2002) . We can think of these types as a separate kind Int. We do not care which type represents which size; in fact, these types do not aect the run-time representation of arrays and indices at all, and we use higher-rank polymorphism to generate the types arbitrarily. Hence these types are called phantom types (Fluet and Pucella 2006) .
Suppose that some brand s represents some size n. We ensure that a (nonbottom) value of type (s,'a) barray is an array of the length n, and a (non-bottom) value of type s bindex is a non-negative index less than n. This way, a branded index of the latter type is always in range for a branded array of the former type.
We also dene types 's bindexL and 's bindexH, so that a (non-bottom) value of type s bindexL is a non-negative index, and a (non-bottom) value of the type s bindexH is an index i less than n. As in Section 2, we use continuation-passing style to avoid tagging overhead. The branding operation brand has an essentially higher-rank type: because higher-rank types in OCaml are limited to records, we dene a record type brand_k with a universally quantied type variable 's. Besides branding arrays and indices, the kernel also performs range-(hence, brand-) preserving operations on indices: bsucc increments an index; bpred decrements an index; and bmiddle averages two indices. The operation index_cmp l h k1 k2 compares an indexL with an indexH. If the former does not exceed the latter, we convert both values to bindex and pass them to the continuation k2. Otherwise, we evaluate the thunk k1.
Given such a kernel, we can write the binary search function as follows. (2002) and Kiselyov and Shan (2004) show one such approach in
Haskell, which explicitly constructs a type to represent each value. Hayashi (1994) , Xi and Pfenning (1998) , and Stone (2000; Stone and Harper 2000) also represent values at the type level, using singleton types. These approaches better expose the connection between branding and dependent types, but they are more general than we need here. We simply generate a fresh type eigenvariable.
let brand a k = k.bk (a, 0, Array.length a -1)
The function bmiddle is a brand-(that is, range-) preserving operation on branded indices. Its type says that all indices involved have the same brandthat is, the same value range.
val bmiddle : 's bindex -> 's bindex -> 's bindex let bmiddle i1 i2 = i1 + (i2 -i1)/2
The type of bmiddle corresponds to the proposition
where n is the integer represented by the type proxy s. The implementation for bmiddle delivers a certicate for the proposition.
let index_cmp i j ong onle = if i <= j then onle i j else ong () let bsucc = succ and bpred = pred
Formalization
As in Section 2.2, we can verify safety by a syntactic translation from a sound, fancy language called Strict to an unsound, dull language called Lax. Figure 2 shows how we extend Strict and Lax from Figure 1 with constructs for array-bound checking. We model an n-element array by an n-element list, whose rst element has the index 1. Crucially, we add typesn to Strict, which represent natural numbers (array sizes) n. To maintain compatibility with Lax, these typesn are of kind rather than a separate kind of type-level naturals.
6 http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/ML/eliminating-array-bound-check-literally.ml
Additional typing rules shared between Strict and Lax N : T :
Additional typing rules in Strict n :
Additional typing rules in Lax
array E : List N T N : We introduce these restrictions by sandboxing Lax programs, as in Section 2.2.
Sandboxed programs must be typable in Lax using only the typing rules shared with
Strict. As before, we dene relaxation, a syntax-directed translation from Strict to
Lax. This time relaxation is not just identity, but mapsn to the N in (9). Still, relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and (the transitive closure of ) transitions.
Because again every (well-typed) sandboxed Lax program is the relaxation of some (well-typed) Strict program, a well-typed sandboxed Lax program does not get stuck, even though it may well transition to a non-sandboxed term such as (9), which uses array.
We have mechanized these type soundness arguments in Twelf, slightly less trivially than in Section 2.2. One crucial lemma is that, if a Strict value has a type of the form Int T (where T is any type), then T must be of the formn (where n is a natural number). Intuitively, this lemma means that the type system does not lose any precision due to our not introducing a separate kind for type-level naturals. 
Multiple arrays of various sizes

4
Types as static capabilities
In the style just exemplied, the programmer begins verication by building a domain-specic kernel module that represents and defends the desired safety condition. This kernel provides capabilities to other modules so that they can work safely.
Many safety conditions can be expressed using types as proxies for values.
We now describe each step and the language support they need in turn.
A domain-specic kernel of trust
Program verication typically begins by xing an assertion language. Given a program, its safety condition is then extracted automatically or specied manually before being proven. The soundness of the proof checker guarantees that a veried program will behave safely.
While this approach lets the designer of the verication framework prove soundness once and for all, the desired safety condition may not reside at the same level of abstraction as the assertion language. Such a mismatch makes the safety assertion burdensome to construct formally and brittle to prove automatically. For example, if the assertions speak of bytes and registers, then it is hard to verify that modular numbers of dierent moduli are never mixed together. It takes a lot of work today to translate among layers of representation and verify their correspondence, so this approach works best at a xed (often low) level of abstraction, as in proof-carrying code (Necula 1997 ) and typed assembly language (Morrisett et al. 1999 ).
We let the programmer design more of the assertion language. For example, it is uncontroversial to let the programmer specify a set of events that need to be checked using temporal logic, rather than xing a set of events (such as operating-system calls) to track. This way, even given that the framework is sound, whoever uses the framework must ensure that the assertions soundly express the safety condition desired. In exchange, the programmer can mold the assertion language, for example to express the safety condition for an array index not as a conjunction of inequalities but as an atomic assertion whose meaning is not known to the verier.
Now that the verication framework no longer knows what the assertions mean,
it can no longer build in axioms to justify atomic assertions: because the programmer never denes events in terms of system calls, the framework needs to be told when events occur; because the programmer never denes array bounds in terms of inequalities, the framework needs to be told how to judge an array index in bounds.
We call this knowledge a kernel of trust, which the programmer creates to represent domain-specic safety conditions.
By extending the kernel of trust, the programmer can verify new safety conditions as needed. Each extension must be scrutinized closely to preserve soundness. In exchange, we gain a continuum of correctness in which the programmer can verify more safety conditions as needed.
An expressive programming language allows the user to dene and combine a domain-specic library of components. In this regard, the kernel of trust is like any other domain-specic language: its construction relies on succinct facilities for higher-order abstraction.
Capabilities for extending trust
Our verier, the type system, does not track system calls or solve inequalities, but
propagates certicates of assertions from the user-dened kernel of trust. Safety then extends from the kernel to the rest of the program. It turns out that type systems are good at this propagation: we trust types.
More precisely, we represent trust by type eigenvariables. A type system that supports either higher-rank polymorphism or existential types generates a type eigenvariable fresh in the universal introduction or existential elimination rule (Pierce and Sumii 2000; Reynolds 1983; Rossberg 2003 ). An opaque type from another module is another instance of a type eigenvariable (Mitchell and Plotkin 1988) . Type eigenvariables are good for representing trust to be propagated, because they are
• unforgeable (so only the kernel of trust can manufacture them),
• opaque (so their identity is the only information they convey), and
• propagated by type inference (so they extend trust from the kernel to the rest of the application).
In other words, type eigenvariables turn a static language of types into a capability language (Miller et al. 2000) .
The notion of a capability (Miller et al. 2000 ; Section 3) originated in OS design. A capability is a protected ability to invoke arbitrary services provided by other processes (Wulf et al. 1974) . For a language system to support capabilities (Miller et al. 2000) , access to a particular functionality (for example, access to a collection) must only be via an unforgeable, opaque, and propagated handle. For a computation to use a handle, it must have created the handle, received it from another computation, or looked it up in the initial environment. To use a handle, a computation can only propagate it or perform a set of predetermined actions (for example, read an array).
We represent capabilities as types, so we express safety conditions in types, as in dependent-type programming. If a program type-checks, then the type system and the kernel of trust together verify that the safety conditions hold in any run of the program. In most cases, this static assurance costs us no run-time overhead.
In the remaining cases, an optimizing compiler can discover and eliminate statically apparent identity functions at compile time. By guaranteeing safety statically, we can avoid (often excessive) run-time safety checks such as array bound checks.
A capability is commonly viewed as a pairing of a designated process with a set of services that the process provides (Miller et al. 2000 Moggi and Sabry (2001) . It is also used realistically in the Zipper le-system project, to statically enforce process separation.
Static proxies for dynamic values
To express assertions involving run-time values, we associate each value with a type, such that type equality entails value equality. We call these types proxies for the values (Pa²ali¢ et al. 2002) .
The same proxy appearing in the types of multiple values may make additional operations available from the kernel. For example, the branding described in Section 3.2 lets us access an array at an index that is within the bounds of the same array. This availability is known as rights amplication in the capabilities literature.
Miller et al. (2000) writes:
With rights amplication, the authority accessible from bringing two references together can exceed the sum of authorities provided by each individually. The classic example is the can and the can-openeronly by bringing the two together do we obtain the food in the can.
Discussion
We have argued that the Hindley-Milner type system with higher-rank types is a static capability language with rights amplication. Our take on program verication is not to prove the safety conditions from a xed foundation but to rely on the programmer's trust in a domain-specic kernel. Our technique works in existing languages like Haskell and OCaml, and is compatible with their facilities like mutable cells, native arrays, and general recursion. It requires a modicum of type annotations in the kernel only.
We use types to certify properties of values. For example, the type s bindex in Section 3.2 certies that the index is a non-negative integer less than the array size represented by s. The use of an abstract data type whose values can only be produced by a trusted kernel, and the use of a type system to guarantee this last property, is due to Robin Milner in the design of Edinburgh LCF back in the early 1970s (Gordon 2000) . (Incidentally, the language MLwhose early ospring
OCaml we use in this paperwas originally designed as a scripting language for the LCF prover.) Our branding technique builds on this fundamental idea using an innite family of abstract data types, indexed by a type proxy for a run-time value.
Our approach still has the serious limitation that we do not produce independently statically checkable certicates.
On trusting trust
Our lightweight approach depends on a trusted kernel. Because we expect this kernel to vary across applications and change over time, it is harder to trust the kernel, compared to a genuine dependent type system. We have only optimistic speculations to oer at this point.
On one hand, a small kernel may be more amenable to formal treatment than the entire application at once. Even in our most complex examples, verifying imperative and nonprimitively recursive code, our trusted kernel had no recursive functions (and at most relied on simple arithmetic). Seen this way, delineating a kernel of trust is simply a modular strategy towards complete verication. This strategy straddles the line between proof assistants and programming environments, calling for their further integration.
On the other hand, programmers may be more productive, and verication failures more informative, if the framework does not force verifying the part of correctness that is closest to the foundations rst. After all, successive renement of (sketches of ) proofs is a time-tested technique. Moving along this continuum of correctness may also give a better idea where the code tends to have bugs, and hence where to concentrate verication. Altenkirch et al. (2005;  Section 2) survey dependent type systems and their emulations (Dybjer 1991; Martin-Löf 1984; Nordström et al. 1990 ). Our use of type proxies and run-time veriable certicates puts us near the dependently-typed system MetaD (Pa²ali¢ et al. 2002) . Our work may be thought of as yet another poor man's emulation of a dependent type system (Fridlender and 
Dependent type systems
Mixing static and dynamic checking
Static program analyses are rarely exact because they approximate program behavior without knowing dynamic data. The approximation must be conservative, and so the range analysis, for example, may worry that an index is out of bounds of an array although in reality it is not. To reduce the approximation error, an analysis may insert dynamic checks. Exactly the same is the case for lightweight static capabilities, except the programmer rather than the compiler controls where to insert dynamic checks. We would expect the programmer to understand the program better than the compiler does, and hence to know better where dynamic checks are appropriate and where they are excessive.
A good concrete example is using one index to access two arrays of the same size.
Suppose that we want to feed a branded array ba1 to an array-to-array function compute_array, which we expect to return another array a2 of equal size. We then want to access both arrays using one index. Because ba1 is branded before a2 is created, we cannot brand the two arrays at the same time as in Section 3.4. Instead, we can forget the branding of ba1, compute the array a2, and assign a2 the brand of ba1 after a run-time test: let a2 = compute_array (unbrand ba1) in brand_as a2 ba1 on_mismatched_size (fun ba2 -> ...)
The arrays ba1 and ba2 now have the same brand. We assume the kernel has generic, application-independent functions unbrand and brand_as.
If we can prove that compute_array yields an array of size equal to that of its argument, then we can make the function return a branded array, and thus eliminate the run-time size test. Because branding can only be done in the kernel, we must put the function into the kernel, after appropriate rigorous (perhaps formal)
verication. The programmer decides whether to expand the trusted kernel for a new application, balancing the cost of the run-time check against the cost of verifying the kernel extension.
The brand_as approach is similar to the assert/cast dynamic test in MetaD (Pa²ali¢ et al. 2002) . Such a cop-out to deciding type equality is necessary anyway in a dependent type system with general recursion, where type equality is not decidable in general (Altenkirch et al. 2005 ; Section 3).
Syntactic sugar
Writing conditionals in continuation-passing-style, as we do here, makes for ungainly code. We also miss pattern matching and deconstructors. These syntactic issues arise because neither OCaml nor Haskell was designed for this kind of programs.
The ugliness is far from a show stopper, but an incentive to develop front ends to kmpMatch str pat = brandPS str (\bstrlen -> brandPS pat (\bpatlen -> runST (kmpMatch' bstrlen bpatlen)) 0 --empty pattern, matches the beginning of (nonempty) string ) (-1) --empty string, doesn't match any pattern It is instructive to compare the inferred type of loopShift or loop with the annotations in the corresponding DML code. The annotations cannot be inferred and must be specied by the programmer. The appearance of the Haskell code can be improved if we replace various comparison functions such as index_p_lt, nat_p_lt, etc. with one (type-class) overloaded inx operator, e.g., <.
We now describe the trusted kernel for our Haskell code; the kernel also implements functions that correspond to DML's dependently-typed built-ins sub, length, arrayShift, etc. The kernel uses a number of wrapper types such as BIndex, which represent various capabilities. These wrappers are newtypes and so have no run-time cost. The data constructors of the wrappers must not be exported from the trusted kernel; only the kernel should be allowed to create the capabilities.
The capabilities such as BIndex r or BPackedString r are tagged by a phantom type r, which is a type proxy for a positive natural number plen ( The type BIndex r asserts that the wrapped integer i satises 0 <= i < plen where plen is the integer represented by the proxy r. This newtype declaration corresponds to DML's {j:int | 0 <= j < plen}. Likewise, BPackedString r is a type proxy for a nonempty packed string of the size represented by r. Since the type BIndex r assures that the index is denitely within the bounds of the string BPackedString r, we could safely use unsafeIndexPS to access the element of the We introduce two other type proxies, for oset indices: BIndexP1 r asserts that the wrapped integer j satises 0 < j <= plen; IntShift r is a type proxy for the integer i such that 0 <= (i + 1) < plen. It is instructive to compare the latter with the DML declaration of the dependent type intShift. newtype BIndexP1 r = BIndexP1 Int newtype IntShift r = IntShift Int
The type proxy r is actually an eigenvariable, introduced by the following function after a check that the packed string (whose length is plen) is indeed nonempty: brandPS:: PackedString The Haskell KMP code also uses the type proxy Nat for a non-negative integer.
We elide the corresponding operations.
We should stress again the opportunity of making the syntax better by using overloaded functions and operators. The fact all these branded values have distinct types facilitates such overloading.
